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“An atheistic American is a
contradiction in terms”1: Religion,
Civic Belonging and Collective
Identity in the United States
Amandine Barb
1 “Atheists are outsiders in the United States.”2Such was the title of an article written by
Samuel Huntington and published in the Wall Street Journal in 2004. The Harvard political
scientist explained that the United States was historically a nation of “Christians” and
“believers”, and that therefore atheists could « legitimately see themselves as strangers »
in American society. His assertion may appear exaggerated and provocative, but looking
at  various  polls  on  public  opinion  and  religion  in  the  United  States,  it  seems  that
Americans’ general perception of non-believers3 confirms to some extent Huntington’s
analysis.  Indeed,  two surveys  from the  Pew Forum on  Religion  and  Public  Lifeshow for
instance that atheists are the only (ir)religious group that regularly gathers a majority of
negative opinion.4 In 2007, more than half of the respondents (53%) had an unfavorable
perception of atheists (35% for Muslims and 27% for Mormons). Therefore, it appears that
in today’s United States non-believers are a disliked minority, one that occupies – at least
symbolically - a marginal place within American society. 
2 The distrust  towards atheism is  of  course not  uncommon in history.  As they do not
consider  themselves  accountable  to  any  higher  power  and  do  not  believe  in  divine
punishment after life, atheists have been stigmatized and rejected as immoral in various
times and places. PlatoandThomas of Aquinasboth pleaded for the banishment - if not for
the execution -  of  those who overtly refused to recognize a deity.The Enlightenment
philosophers often considered unbelief as one of the exceptions to the religious tolerance
they defended. John Locke argued that non-believers could not be accepted as legitimate
members of the political community, since “promises, covenants, and oaths, which are
the bonds of human society, can have no hold upon an atheist”, while Voltaire similarly
refused to tolerate unbelievers, arguing that their lack of belief in God was a threat to
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society.5 Yet, in today’s United States, such a popular distrust towards atheism seems at
first  sight  surprising.  Indeed,  in  American  society,  where  the  right  to  “believe  and
disbelieve” is strictly guaranteed by the 1st Amendment,6 non-believers only represent a
small minority – about 5% - of the population.7 Therefore, this seemingly paradoxical and
intriguing situation invites a deeper study of the status and perception of atheists, not
only in contemporary American society, but also more generally in the history of the
United States, in order to better understand how and why non-believers have come to be
such a disliked minority, thought of by some as legitimate “outsiders”.
3 Penny Edgell explains that in a society, “the creation of [an] ‘other’ is always necessary
for the creation of identity and solidarity”8.  Charles Taylor similarly argues that in a
democracy,  the  formation  of  “internal  otherness”9 and  the  process  of  (symbolic)
exclusion are “by-product of the need (…) of a high degree of cohesion.”10Starting from
these assumptions, it is crucial to analyze to what extent the atheist has played in the
United States this role of a necessary “other”, one of the figures against which Americans
have built  and reinforced their collective identity throughout the centuries.  To what
extent has unbelief in the United States been historically categorized as a “stigma”, that
is,  in  Erving  Goffman’s  terms,  as  an  attribute  which  is  “socially  discrediting”,  and
considered as “abnormal” and “undesirable”?11 It is then necessary to go further and to
understand what this historical “othering” and stigmatization of atheism - its exclusion
from what David Hollinger calls the “circle of the We”12 - implies as for the importance of
religion in the representations Americans have had of themselves and of their collective
identity,  i.e.  their  “imagined  communities”13?  In  Money,  Morals  and  Manners,  Michele
Lamont argues that societies are structured around “moral boundaries”, subjective lines
that “we draw between ourselves and others” on the basis of core values and attitudes we
consider  as  “essential”,  and which “presuppose both inclusion (of  the desirable)  and
exclusion (of  the  repulsive)”.  These  “moral  boundaries”  determine who is  legitimate
enough to belong and who is not - who are the “insiders” and the “outsiders”- at the level
of both the private and the public spheres.14 Following Lamont’s framework on “symbolic
boundaries”, this article precisely seeks to demonstrate that the historical “otherness” of
the atheist in the United States evidences the importance of religion as a strong private
and public “moral frontier” in American society. It argues that throughout their history,
Americans have used religion as a symbolic line of demarcation to distinguish between
the individuals and the citizens deemed “desirable” and “trustworthy” (the believers) and
those considered as “repulsive” and “unworthy” (the non-believers). In other words, this
paper asserts, through the case-study of atheism, that religion in the United States has
played the role of what Jeffrey Alexander calls a “symbolic code”, a value at the basis of
“civic solidarity” and “critically important in constituting the very sense of society for
those who are within and without it”15: the constant “othering” of non-believers, from
the colonial times until today, reveals that religion has been commonly perceived as an
essential warranty of both private and public morality - as a crucial criterion of individual
virtue and “good citizenship” and as a basic attribute of the American “self”.
4 But eventually reflecting on the recent rise in the number of Americans who declare
having “no religion” as well as on the new visibility gained by non-believers in American
society over the last decade, this article will also assess to what extent religion is,  to
follow Michele Lamont’s distinction, a “guarded” – fixed and impassable – boundary, or,
on the contrary, an “open” - permeable and expandable - “moral frontier”, which would
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make it possible to envision a greater acceptance of atheists in the United States in the
near future.
1.  
II. The Historical Construction of the Atheist as the ‘Other’
in the United States
“Starting from this polluting fountain, I might trace the progress of vice and misery
in a thousand narratives…how infidelity towards God leads to infidelity towards
man and woman, destroys domestic peace and harmony, breaks up marriages,
blunts  the  natural  feelings  and  affections  between  parents  and  children,  and
dissolves families. I might show the origin of fraud in young men, of lewdness and
prostitution in young woman”16 
5 To  better  understand  how  an  “atheistic  American”  came  to  be  understood  as  a
“contradiction in terms” and what this negative perception of unbelief reveals of the
importance of religion for civic belonging and collective identity in the United States, it is
first  necessary  to  study  the  theological,  cultural  and  political  patterns  that  have
contributed, from the colonial times until the 21st century, to the constant “othering” of
atheists from a certain American collective imagination: how and why not to believe in
God came to be regarded throughout the centuries, not only as a moral and social stigma,
but also as an essentially “un-American” behavior. Throughout this historical analysis,
religion will clearly surfaceas a significant “moral boundary” - as a “principle of (private
and public) classification and identification”17 within American society – closely tied to
the dominant ideals of morality and citizenship in the United States. 
6  In American colonial society, as in John Locke’s England or in Voltaire’s France during
the  same  period,  non-believers  –  even  though  they  were  almost  inexistent  –  were
commonly loathed and feared. The figure of the “village atheist” pertained to the
collective imagination, as that of an immoral and dangerous individual abandoned by
God,  unable  to distinguish  between good and evil,  and condemned to  be  an  eternal
outcast, “detested, abhorred and despised by everybody, as pest and plague to society.”18
In a traditional rhetorical script that became known as the “Jeremiad”,19 religious and
political leaders often instrumentalized this popular fear of irreligion to guarantee the
social order and the unity of the community. Prophesying the decay of religious beliefs
and the imminent spread of atheism almost became a kind of “cultural ritual”20 among
New England pilgrims, designed to guarantee religious, social and political obedience.
John Winthrop, the Governor of the Massachusetts bay colony, often agitated the specter
of atheism in his sermons, warning immigrants that a “laissez-aller” in their religious
commitment could lead to the breach of the Covenant they had passed with God, and thus
to the fall of the “city upon a hill” they had dreamt of building in their new land.21 A
century after Winthrop, during the first “Great Awakening” of the 1730s, the preacher
Jonathan Edwards  similarly  warned people  of  the  risks  of  religious  indifference  and
enjoined them to turn to God in order to avoid a moral decay of the community. 
7  Irreligion in Winthrop’s and Edward’s discourses was not only rejected as a religious
fault, as an individual sin, but also and above all as a social and political offense that could
have threatened the moral purity and the stability of the whole community. Atheism was
therefore stigmatized as what Jeffrey Alexander calls a “civic vice”,  i.e.  an “impure”,
“illegitimate”, and ”unworthy” social behavior that could have represented a potential
“pollution” of the community – bringing immorality, licentiousness and anarchy - and
thus that had to be legitimately “kept at bay”, on the margins of society.22 As Alexander
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further argues, it is precisely “in terms of symbolic purity and impurity” that within a
community, “marginal demographic status is made more meaningful”, and “centrality is
defined.”23.  Thus,  in American colonial  society,  religion was already emphasized as  a
crucial individual, social and political value, as a “symbolic boundary” – one among many
others  –  safeguarding  the  community  from  the  danger  of  moral  deviance  and
distinguishing between those who had the legitimacy to belong and those who did not.24
It was, for instance, for the very purpose of avoiding a “pollution” of the community by
potential irreligious individuals, that most colonies decided to limit their rights and their
participation in the life of the polity. Atheists were traditionally prohibited from serving
as witnesses in a trial or from being members of a jury.25 A vast majority of the colonies
also required candidates for public office to take a religious oath, thus excluding religious
minorities (Quakers, Baptists, Presbyterians, Jews, etc.), when there was an established
church, as well as non-believers in any case. In this regard, it is interesting to note that
John  Locke  himself  contributed  to  the  political  implementation  of  his  philosophical
rejection of atheism in the American colonies, when he took part in 1669 in the drafting
of the “Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina”,  of which Article 95 stated that overt
irreligion was “illegal” on the whole territory of the colony: “No man shall be permitted
to be a freeman of Carolina, or to have any estate or habitation within it, that doth not
acknowledge a Lord and that God is publicly and solemnly to be worshipped.”26. Belief in
God became therefore in this particular case a requirement of the law itself, necessary,
even if not sufficient, to be considered a “pure”, “virtuous” and legitimate member of the
community.
8  After the War of Independence, some of the new American states similarly continued to
impose restrictions on religious minorities and, of course, on non-believers, notably by
requiring individuals to take a religious oath to testify in courts or to hold a public office.
27 Even in cases where the official church had been disestablished and religious liberty
inscribed  in  the  law,  political  authorities,  convinced  of  the  social  utility  of  having
religiously committed citizens, still tried to foster belief in God and an active religious
practice,  as  exemplified  in  the  Constitution  of  Vermont.  Ratified  in  1786,  the  text
guaranteed complete religious freedom,  but  nonetheless  explicitly  stated that  citizens 
ought to practice their faith, in order to maintain a “religious spirit” indispensable to the
“moral purity” of the society. Chapter I, Article III affirmed that “all men have a natural
and unalienable right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own
consciences (…). Nevertheless, every sect or denomination ought to (…) keep up some sort
of religious worship, which to them shall seem most agreeable to the revealed will of
God.” This official discouragement of religious indifference clearly indicates that religion
was considered in Vermont – as in most of the new American states – as a necessary “civic
virtue”, as a basic and essential attribute of the new republican citizen.
9  More  significantly,  this  ambiguity  between  the  necessary  protection  of  freedom of
conscience and the promotion of religion as a useful social and civic value was also salient
at that time in the Founding Fathers’ thoughts on the place of religion in public life. Both
the Federal Constitution of 1787 and the Bill of Rights of 1791, which they contributed to
draft, by respectively prohibiting religious tests for federal public offices (Article 6) and
the establishment of religion at the level of the national government (1st Amendment),
made clear that belonging to the political community – citizenship - did not depend at all
on a belief  in God,  and that the (federal)  state could not legitimately use religion to
distinguish between citizens. As James Madison wrote, “no man's right is abridged by the
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institution of Civil Society and (…) religion is wholly exempt from its cognizance.”28. All
the more emphasizing the secular character of the new federal government, the founding
document of the United States made absolutely no reference to Christianity, to God or
even  to  a  “Supreme  Being”  or  a “Divine  Providence”,  as  such  was  the  case  in  the
Declaration of Independence in 1776, leading many alarmed commentators to denounce
the dangerous religious “infidelity” of the drafters.29 And it is indeed true that, far from
being  pious  Christians,  some  of  the  most  important  Founding  Fathers  –  Franklin,
Jefferson,  Madison,  and Adams -  were  closer  to  Deism,  influenced by  Enlightenment
philosophers in their conception of a “benevolent Supreme Being” who created the world
but did not intervene in human affairs. 
10 Yet, even those “infidel deists”, who wrote and ratified a “Godless Constitution”, seemed
to believe, as Locke did, that some sort of “religious spirit” was necessary to maintain a
healthy republican society.  Indeed,  once elected presidents,  George Washington,  John
Adams and James Madison regularly exhorted Americans to believe in God. Despite their
deeply  held  conviction  that  the  “business  of  civil  government”  was  to be  “exactly
distinguished from that of religion,”30 they still closely associated belief in God, morality,
and “good citizenship”  as  three  complementary  qualities.  Encouraging  some kind  of
diffuse religious spirit was for the Founding Fathers a way to guarantee that people would
have a minimum set of moral values, which they believed could contribute to make them
more virtuous citizens, and more likely to respect the new laws of the young republic.
Washington,  in  his  1796  Farewell  Address,  written  by  Alexander  Hamilton,  famously
stated that it was unreasonable to believe that “national morality could be maintained in
exclusion  of  religious  principle.”31 John  Adams  similarly  wrote  in  1798  that  “our
Constitution was made only for a moral and religious people”, one year after he had
signed the Treaty of Tripoli,  whose Article XI reaffirmed the secular character of the
American  Republic  (“The  American  government  is  not  in  any  sense  founded on  the
Christian  religion”).  Jefferson,  who  was  perhaps  the  only  Founding  Father  who  was
openly willing to tolerate atheists, suggesting that they could be protected under the 1st
Amendment,32 allowed  during  his  presidency  the  public  funding  of  American  Bible
Societies. Created at the beginning of the 19th century by another Founding Father, John
Jay, they were supposed to “promote the extension of true religion, virtue and learning”
in order to “clean” the “impurities of our moral atmosphere”33. Therefore, it seems that
even for the most skeptical Founding Fathers, religion appeared as one of the most useful
warranties of “civic solidarity”34 in a Republican society. Overt atheism, if it could not
legally alter one’s status as an American citizen, was still to be discouraged as deviant
social behavior, better confined to the margins of the Republic. 
11 The stigmatization and “othering” of unbelief still continued to sharpen in the first half
of the 19th century, as religion also began to play a central role in the building of a certain
American identity. During this period, the United States was indeed characterized by a
powerful movement of religious revivalism, the second “Great Awakening”. Evangelical
sects  started  proliferating  throughout  the  country,  converting  people  massively  in
famous “camp meetings”, while romantic historians undertook the “Christianization” –
or more precisely the “Protestantization” - of the American Republic. They heightened in
their works the myth of a Protestant nation founded for religious reasons on religious
principles by religious men35. More than being a “civic virtue”, religion became intimately
linked with the history, culture and core values of the United States, thus gaining even
more salience as a “moral boundary” in Americans’ collective imaginations.   
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12 In this context, where religious minorities such as Catholics were also stigmatized and
discriminated against by protestant nativists,36 irreligion, more than being a threat for
the “moral purity” of the community and for republican values, came to be progressively
castigated as “un-American” in essence. As religion became more and more integrated
into “the ethos of American life”, unbelief “was becoming all the more inconceivable.37
Thus, the figure of the atheist became increasingly associated, not only with the figure of
the deviant immoral citizen, but also with the figure of the alien or of the nation’s enemy
more generally. At the beginning of the 19th century for instance, atheism came to be
systematically linked to the violence of the French Revolution. The writer Mercy Otis
Warren expressed her fears that the “cloud of infidelity that darkened the hemisphere of
France” could travel to the other side of the Atlantic and poison the American “national
character,  (…)  free  from  any  symptoms  of  pernicious  deviations  from  the  purest
principles of morality, religion and civil liberty.”38 Thomas Jefferson, who had lived in
France  during  the  Revolution,  was  accused  by  his  Federalist  adversaries  and  by
Evangelical preachers of being an “atheist in religion”. Alexander Hamilton, in a series of
articles  entitled  The  Stand, repeatedly  warned  Americans  against  “French  atheism”,
particularly against the “political leader of the adherents to France”, the “pro-consul of a
despotic Directory”, whose election as president would “destroy religion.39 A Connecticut
penman asserted even more categorically that “we are not Frenchmen, and until  the
atheistical philosophy of a certain great Virginian shall become the fashion (which God
on his mercy forbid), we shall never be.40 
13  This strong rejection of atheism and the importance of religion as a “symbolic code” – as
a principle of social categorization and identification - , was noticed by Felix de Beaujour,
a  French  diplomat  assigned  to  Washington  between  1804  and  1811,  and  who  was
surprised  to  discover  that  if  Americans  seemed  indeed  ready  to  accept  almost
“indistinctly” any kind of religious faiths or practices, “atheists alone [were] rejected”. He
explained further that “[Americans] regarded [atheists] less as the enemies of God than of
society”,  (…)  on  the  principle  that  the  truth  of  each  religion,  individually,  may  be
contested, but the utility of all is incontestable”.41Religion, as an indispensable basis for
morality, “civic solidarity” and collective belonging in the United States, was thus more
generally understood as an essential constituent of a certain Durkheimian “moral order”,
i.e. of “a common public perception of reality that regulated, structured and organized
relations in the community (…), (operating) less through coercion than through inter-
subjectivity”  and which  contributed  to  “define  the  internal  bonds”  within  American
society.42  
14  This  crucial  role  of  religion in  19 th century  American society  was  confirmed a  few
decades later by De Beaujour’s fellow citizen Alexis de Tocqueville, who also noticed that
an individual who dared to express his irreligion publicly and – even worse – to criticize
religious beliefs, was almost immediately despised and shunned by other Americans. In a
comment that is still relevant today, he wrote that “in the United States, if a politician
attacks a sect, this may not prevent the partisans of that sect from supporting him; but if
he  attacks  all  the  sects  together,  every  one  abandons  him and he  remains  alone.”43
Tocqueville acknowledged that some Americans probably did not believe very sincerely
in their faith: “I do not know whether all the Americans have a sincere faith in their
religion – for who can search the Human heart?”. But he also judiciously remarked that
the skeptics would always rather lie and say that they believed in God: “among Anglo-
Americans, there are some who profess Christian dogmas because they believe them, and
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others who do because they are afraid to look as though they did not believe them”. Thus,
in order to hide and to overcome their “stigma”, the non-believers met by Tocqueville
felt  compelled to resort to what Erving Goffman called the strategy of “passing”,  i.e.
pretending to be part of the “unstigmatized (religious) majority” in order to “gain social
acceptance,”44 an attitude that all the more testified of the “social desirability bias” of
religion and of its strength as a “moral boundary” in American society. 
15 The various trials for blasphemy that were held at that time in the United States give
another meaningful illustration of the centrality of religion (Christianity to be precise),
for a certain “moral order”. In various states, individuals were prosecuted for having
denied the existence of God or for having attacked and insulted the Christian religion.
Yet,  blasphemy was  not  sanctioned for  theological  reasons  –  in  order  to  defend the
dogmas and beliefs of a specific faith - but rather because it served a secular purpose, i.e.
guaranteeing public safety. In a country inhabited mostly by Christians, attacks against
their religion – and thus their identity - could indeed potentially represent a source of
conflict. When in 1837 the Supreme Court of Delaware condemned an individual named
Thomas Jefferson Chandler for having declared that “the Virgin Mary is a whore and
Jesus Christ a bastard”, the Judges clearly explained that the anti-blasphemy laws of the
state were not designed to protect a faith in particular or even religion in general, but
were necessary to preserve the unity and integrity of a community that such comments
against its deeply held beliefs and identity could offend and divide: “The common law
took cognizance of offences against God only when by their inevitable effect they became
offences against man and his temporal security .”45
16 As  mentioned  earlier,  non-believers  were  of  course  not  the  only  religious  minority
despised and stigmatized in that way in 19th century America:  to the sound of “anti-
Popery” cries, Protestant nativists regularly attacked Catholic immigrants, accusing them
of being a threat to republican values and questioning their loyalty to the American
government. But in the first half of the 20th century, the American “circle of the We”
started widening progressively, as religious minorities were increasingly being culturally,
socially, and politically accepted into American society.46 A 1959 Gallup survey testified of
this process of inclusion, as 72% of Americans affirmed that they were ready to elect a
Jewish President  and 70% a  Catholic,  a  result  that  was  confirmed one  year  later  by
Kennedy’s victory.47 Yet, this broader tolerance of religious diversity did not necessarily
imply  that  religion  as  a  “moral  boundary”  -  as  a  standard  of  morality  and  “good
citizenship”  and  as  a  basic  attribute  of  the  American  “self”-  was  disappearing  and
becoming irrelevant in the United States. Indeed, while the 19th century Protestant nation
was becoming a “Judeo-Christian” country, the atheist continued to be perceived and
stigmatized as an unacceptable “other” in American society.
17 Its symbolic exclusion and its status of “outsider” even worsened during that period,
when in the official rhetoric of the US government against the USSR, Communism and
atheism came to be systematically associated with each other, conflated into the common
figure of the anti-American enemy. In the language of religious and political leaders, the
“godless  communist”  was  often  contrasted  with  the  “religious  American”.  Joseph
McCarthy declared for instance in a speech, that the “Christian world”, led by the United
States, was facing the “atheist world”, dominated by the USSR.48 Alluding once again to
the “impurity” of atheism and to the risk of moral “pollution” it raised, American officials
explicitly  encouraged irreligious  Americans  to  give up their  deviant  and “pernicious
doctrine of materialism”, which, as the director of the FBI J. Edgar Hoover pointed out,
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“readied the minds of our youth to accept the immoral (…) system of thought [known] as
communism”49. And it was for the very purpose of exacerbating the religious identity of
the United States against the “cold” atheism of the USSR, that Congress decided to add
“Under God” in the Pledge of  Allegiance and “In God We Trust”  on the dollar  bills,
respectively  in  1954 and 1956.50 A  few years  earlier,  in  1952,  senators,  supported by
President Truman - to whom Communism was the “deadly foe of belief in God and of all
organized religions”51 - had already decided to establish a National Day of Prayer. Their
intention was to defend the United States against “the corrosive forces of Communism,
which sought simultaneously to destroy [the American] democratic way of life and the
faith in an Almighty God on which it was based.”52
18 Socially and politically marginalized since the founding of the first colonies, stigmatized
as  an  immoral  and  dangerous  citizen  throughout  the  19th century,  the  non-believer
became the official  enemy of the American Republic during the Cold War.  Professing
one’s irreligion - even in one’s private life - meant to symbolically break away from the
rest  of  American society and to share the same values as  the Soviet  enemy.  As Will
Herberg wrote in 1955,  “declaring oneself  atheist,  agnostic or even humanist” in the
United  States  during  that  period,  almost  inevitably  implied  “being  obscurely  ‘anti-
American’.”53 During the Cold War, the stigmatization of the atheist as an “other” reached
its climax: like Communism, unbelief was perceived as intrinsically incompatible - and
irreconcilable  -  with  the  nation’s  history,  values  and identity.  Relegated  beyond the
boundaries of the “We”, the atheist, just as the Communist during the same period, could
never  be  assimilated  into  the  fabric  of  society  and could  only  be  imagined  as  a
“dissident”, an “alien” or an “enemy”, fundamentally different from – and antagonistic to
- the (good) American citizen. Religion clearly surfaced as a seemingly impassable “moral
boundary”, separating the insiders from the outsiders (the atheists) - those “who did not
share the core characteristics” of the “legitimate participants in the ‘moral order’ ” and
against  whom  the  symbolic  “contours  of  American  culture  and  citizenship  were
imagined.”54 The “good American” was the “good believer”.
1.  
III. Beyond the Religious Boundary: The Difficult
Mainstreaming of Unbelief in American Society  
19 Despite being stigmatized as eternal “others”, a few American atheists, refusing to “pass”
as  believers,  actually  tried,  throughout  the  centuries,  to  gaingreater  acceptance  and
visibility  in  American  society.  Using  diverse  rhetoric  strategies  and  actions,  those
assertive  non-believers  have  aimed  at  gaining  a  juridical,  social  and  political
“recognition”, while seeking a “mainstreaming” of atheism within American society in
order  to  precisely  “deconstruct”  and  untie  the  links  between  religion,  morality,
citizenship and collective  identity  the  United States.  From the beginning of  the 19th
century until today, they have attempted to “open” the “moral boundary” of religion and
to render it irrelevant as a “symbolic code” and as a “principle of (private and public)
classification and identification” within American society.
20 Claiming the legacy of illustrious skeptics such as Tom Paine, Elihu Palmer or Thomas
Jefferson,American  atheists,  and  “freethinkers”  more  generally,  began  to  organize
themselves as  early as  the 1820s,  in order to defend their  rights  and their  status in
American society. Some of them, as the “Great Agnostic” Robert Ingersoll, managed to
gain a cultural and political preeminence in the years 1860-1890, the period known as the
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“Golden Age of Freethought.”55Starting in the first half of the 20th century, they also
regularly went to courts to protest against the real or symbolic support afforded by the
state to religion, and to defend the constitutional protection of atheism, whose status
under  the  1st Amendment  had  long  been  controversial  and  unclear. 56 But,  as  Axel
Honneth points it out, law is also often a primary tool for marginalized individuals or
groups seeking recognition within society.57 Therefore, American non-believers also used
the courts as a way to gain a first legal acknowledgment in the United States and to
demonstrate that one could indeed be a “full” citizen, with equal rights before the law,
even without believing in God.
21 It was not until 1947 and the case Everson v. Board of Education that the Supreme Court
officially confirmed that non-religion was protected under the 1st Amendment and that
citizens were as free to profess their unbelief as they were to express their faith. Justice
Hugo Black, writing the majority opinion for the Court, explicitly recognized the right not
to  believe  in  God:  “Neither  [a  state  nor  the  Federal  government]   (…)  can force  nor
influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force him to
profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or
professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs.”58 In 1952, in Zorach v. Clauson, the same Justice
Black insisted once again on the necessity to include non-believers under the scope of
protection guaranteed by the 1st Amendment: “The First Amendment has lost much if the
religious follower and the atheist are no longer to be judicially regarded as entitled to
equal  justice  under  law.”59 Justice  Black  affirmed  in  his  opinion  that  even  if  one
acknowledged that religion was intimately linked to the history of the United States and
to the collective identity of its people, these facts did not give the state a legitimate right
to  privilege  religion  over  non-religion  under  the  1st Amendment:  “a  people  can  be
basically religious and their primary law and constitution can still afford equal rights to
the irreligious.” Therefore, these two significant rulings emphasized the fact that religion
– despite its recognized cultural, social, historical and political significance in the United
States  -  could not  legally  function as  a  demarcation between citizens  and could not
legitimately be favored by the state to the detriment of non-religious individuals.60
22 But beyond their recognition under the 1st Amendment, all the legal disabilities that had
been imposed upon atheists in American history since the founding of the first colonies
eventually disappeared in 1961, when the Supreme Court decided that the provisions of
some states’ Constitutions still requiring candidates to public offices to take an oath on
God were a violation of the Establishment Clause. In Torcaso v. Watkins, the Justices ruled
unconstitutional Article 37 of the Maryland Bill of Rights, which stated that “No religious
test ought ever to be required for any office or profit or trust in this state, other than a
declaration of belief in the existence of God”. Justice Black reaffirmed that the state could
not “constitutionally pass laws or impose requirements which aid all religions as against
non-believers.”61 He suggested that the old popular fears against irreligion that had in
some  sense  justified  the  inclusion  of  such  tests  in  the  17th and  18 th centuries  were
irrelevant in 20th century American society. According to Black and to the other Justices,
the historical conceptions of unbelief as a “civic vice”, and of religion as an essential
warranty of morality and “good citizenship” had no more legitimacy in the United States.
Atheists could no longer be deemed less moral and less virtuous simply because of their
lack of belief in God. They had to enjoy exactly the same rights as other citizens and be
legally acknowledged as “worthy”, “moral” and “legitimate” members of the political
community.62
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23  Yet,  some non-believers went even further in their attempts to challenge the moral
ascendancy of religion and its importance for civic belonging and collective identity in
the United States. They also started asking for the outlawing of the religious symbols in
the public sphere, from “Under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance to “In God We Trust” on
coins and dollar bills. They argued that even if those references to God did not threaten
their rights as citizens, they still made it difficult for them to identify with the nation’s
symbols, thus weakening their sense of belonging and giving them the impression that
they were condemned to remain eternally beyond the “moral boundary” of the American
citizenry. Associations of non-believers such as American Atheists or the Freedom From
Religion  Foundation  sued  the  federal  government  and  the  local  states  on  several
occasions against these religious symbols. As of today, all their attempts have failed, as
the courts have repeatedly argued, in the logic of a “passive secularism,”63 that religious
symbols in the public sphere do not amount to an establishment of religion since they
have an obvious historical  dimension,  are non sectarian,  and do not force anyone to
believe  or  disbelieve64.  In  2002,  the  decision of  a  California  district  court  to  declare
unconstitutional  the  two  words  “Under  God”  in  the  Pledge  of  Allegiance  after  the
complaint of an atheist, Michael Newdow, provoked very strong negative reactions on
national level. Congressmen unanimously passed a resolution to maintain “Under God”,
and dozens of representatives and senators gathered on the steps of the Capitol to recite
the Pledge of Allegiance in front of cameras.65 
24 These failed attempts of militant atheists to convince the courts that religious symbolism
makes them feel like stigmatized “others” in their own country, directly illustrates the
fact  that  despite  the  explicit  legal  recognition of  non-believers’  rights  under  the  1st
Amendment,  to  challenge  and  transcend  the  “moral  boundary”  of  religion  remains
difficult  in  a  country  which  considers  religious  faith  an  integral  part  of  its
“exceptionalism” and where almost 90% of the population declares believing in God and
76% in “life after death.”66 
25 The persistence of religion as a core value still determining the contours of the “circle of
the We” in the United States, is also confirmed by the fact that atheists tend to remain
one of  the  most  disliked  minorities  in  today’s  American  society.  Several  surveys
conducted since the beginning of the 2000s reveal indeed that in contemporary United
States, unbelief is still considered a social and political stigma, and that religion continues
to  function  as  a  strong  “symbolic  code”  for  private  morality  and  good  citizenship,
central“in constituting the very sense of society” for a significant number of Americans. 
26 A recent survey of the University of Minnesota showed, for example, that a significant
part  of  the  American population  still  thinks  of  the opposition  between religion  and
atheism in terms of symbolic “purity” and “impurity”, and still considers a lack of belief
in  God as  a  moral  disability.67 39.6% of  the  respondents  affirmed,  for  instance,  that
atheists “did not at all agree with [their] vision of American society” - 10% more than for
Muslims68.  As  Penny  Edgell  points  it  out,  this  result  demonstrates  that  for  many
Americans,  atheists  still  appear  as  “others”,  with  whom they  do  not  feel  linked  by
common values or a sense of belonging. Moreover, the fact that 47.6 % of the respondents
said that they “would not like their child to marry an atheist” – 33,5% in the case of a
Muslim - also indicates that for a large percentage of the American population today,
atheists  are  more  likely  than  religious  people  to  be  deviant  and  less  trustworthy
individuals. Thus, religion still appears to function as what Michele Lamont calls a “moral
status signal” in today’s United States.69
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27 But for many Americans, the atheist is not only a social misfit, he also remains a less
reliable citizen, less “morally fit” than others to properly serve society and the common
good, as seems to indicate the rather low percentage - 45% - who declared in a 2007
Gallup survey that they would be ready to elect an atheist for President.70 The fact that
this number has almost not changed for the last three decades – it was 40% in 1978 -
whereas the acceptance of other groups has tended to increase over the years - with a few
exceptions (for example homosexuals and Mormons), and thus that “in the face of rising
pluralism and toleration, atheists alone have been left out in the cold”71 seems all the
more revealing and noteworthy. It confirms that in today’s American society, religion
continues to be perceived as one of the basis of“civic solidarity” and of a certain “moral
order”.
28 In  this  context,  it  does  not  come  as  a  surprise  that  many  Americans  still  tend  to
overemphasize  their  own  degree  of  religious  commitment.  Sociologists  have  indeed
noticed a significant difference between the percentage of people who declare that they
go to church every week (about 40%) and the percentage of people who actually do – as
observed by  pollsters  (about  20%).72 This  tendency of  Americans  to  exaggerate  their
religious participation confirms that religion in the United States still carries a strong
“social desirability bias”. Americans’ religious beliefs, practices and belongings may be
becoming  more  and  more  vague,  undetermined  and  porous73,  but  the  positive
“reputation”74 of  religion in general  is  still  overwhelmingly strong:  to believe in God
remains  perceived  as  a  meaningful  “civic  virtue”,  closely  associated  in  collective
imaginaries  with  the  dominant  conception  of  what  the  (good)  American  citizen  is
supposed to be. 
29 Finally, it is even more striking to note that some avowed non-believers, having deeply
interiorized the strong prejudices that exist towards them, still find it difficult to directly
admit their religious indifference in the United States. Thus, they tend to downplay it.
Alan Wolfe already observed in his study of middle-class Americans that “people who
talked about their lack of belief in God did so hesitantly, even defensively, rather than as
a self-proclamation.”75 And according to a 2008 survey from the Pew Forum on Religion
and Public Life, only a small percentage – 24% - of those who declare that they do not
believe  in  God  actually  refer  themselves  as  “atheists”,  a  word  that  many  find  too
negatively connoted, especially since the Cold War.76 A majority of non-believers, when
asked to categorize themselves, choose not to do so or prefer using more consensual,
ambiguous  and  supposedly  acceptable  terms  such  as  “humanist”,  “freethinker”  or
“agnostic”, possibly as a way to “euphemize” their unbelief.77 
30 The historical “otherness” of atheism and the strong prejudices that a significant part of
Americans  still  hold  against  it  would  therefore  indicate  that  religion  is  indeed  a
“guarded”,  impassable  “moral  boundary”  in  Americans’  collective  consciousness,  still
closely tied to ideals  of  private morality,  citizenship and collective identity.  Yet,  the
current  transformations  of  the  American  religious  landscape  combined  with  the
unexpected visibility gained by non-believers since the beginning of the 2000s could also
suggest that a greater openness and acceptance towards unbelief is still possible in the
United States, which would ultimately raise crucial questions and interesting hypothesis
as for the resiliency of religion as a “moral boundary” and for its future as a relevant
“symbolic code” in American society. 
31 Over  the  past  two decades,  there  has  been a  significant  demographic  change in  the
American religious landscape. The number of “unaffiliated Americans”, i.e. those who do
“An atheistic American is a contradiction in terms”: Religion, Civic Belongin...
European journal of American studies, 6-1 | 2011
11
not belong to any religious denomination, has been increasing constantly – though at a
slower pace since 2000. Only 7% in 1990, they represent today 16% of the population. The
fastest growing (ir)religious group in the United States - 22% of Americans aged 18-29
years declare being “unaffiliated”- they could reach 20% of the population by 2030.78
While a majority of those Americans still believes in God or in a “higher power” (51%),
they also tend to attach less importance to religion in their daily lives and in society in
general.79 A study led in 2003 by Michael Hout and Claude Fischer showed for instance
that one of the reasons that led Americans to abandon their religious affiliation was a
frustration towards the politicization of religion in the United States and the influence
gained by conservative Christians.80 In that sense, as Paul Lichterman points it out, the
growing  number  of  the  “unaffiliated”  could  signal  that  “in  many  Americans’  eyes,
religion’s reputation really may have suffered and declined” over the last decade81. It is
therefore possible to suggest that in the coming years the “social desirability bias” of
religion may also decrease in the United States. Less inclined to view it as a hermetic
“moral boundary” and to use it as a “principle of categorization and identification” which
presupposes the exclusion of an irreligious “other”, Americans would therefore also be
less likely to view non-believers as necessarily morally deficient “outsiders”.
32 This  hypothesis  tends  to  be  reinforced by the new visibility  gained by avowed non-
believers  in  American society  since  the  beginning of  the  2000s.  From the  surprising
national  success  of  several  anti-religious  books82 to  the  growth  of  irreligious
organizations  throughout  the  country,83 overt  atheists  have  become  more  vocal  and
dynamic  in  the  United  States  since  G.W.  Bush’s  presidency,  reaching  an  unexpected
popularity.84 Frustrated with the “God-talk” in American politics and tired of “being the
last minority that it is acceptable to despise”, these militants have undertaken the task of
overcoming the strong prejudices associated with unbelief, in order to challenge once
again the link between religion, morality, civic solidarity and collective identity in the
United States. Their first goal has been therefore to fight the social and political stigma of
atheism. Following a logic of identity politics,85 they have resorted to various types of
initiatives  to  make  their  presence  more  visible  in  society  and  to  increase  public
awareness of their situation as a symbolically marginalized minority, from marches on
the Washington Mall to ads on buses. In 2009, in a nationwide campaign that received
large media coverage, the American Humanist Association and the United Coalition of
Reason placed posters advertising atheism on the buses and in the subways of almost
every important American city. An ad in the New York City subway asked rhetorically
“Millions of New Yorkers are good without God. Are you?”, while Manhattan buses stated
similarly that “You don’t have to believe in God to be a moral or ethical person.”86 The
main aim of those peculiar “commercials” was, of course, for militant atheists to present
unbelief not as a social anomaly but as a mainstream, acceptable behavior, shared by a
significant  part  of  the  population.  Other  organizations  like  American  Atheists  have
similarly called for non-believers to “get out” and to be more actively involved in the life
of their neighborhoods, through such activities as “community service, blood donation or
trash pickup”, as a way “to give back to society” and to show other people that one can be
a  “good  citizen”  even  without  believing  in  God.87 Those  assertive  non-believers
correspond to what  Penny Edgell  calls  the “civically  engaged atheists”,  aware of  the
“negative stereotypes” against unbelief and who, as a strategy of “stigma management”,
try  to  build  a  more  “positive”  image  of  themselves.  As  mentioned  earlier,  Jeffrey
Alexander explains that a “civic vice”, in order not to “pollute” the community, must be
confined to its margins. But it can also be “transformed, by communicative actions, into a
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pure form”, i.e. into a “civic virtue”. In trying to demonstrate to the rest of society that
one can “be good without God”88 and that unbelievers are “worthy” enough to be proper
citizens, the new generation of atheists are precisely trying to transform their perceived
“civic vice” or “stigma” - their lack of belief in God - into a positive, “pure” attribute that
can be compatible with being a good American. They are reshaping and adapting what
unbelief  means  in  the  United  States,  to  make  it  better  “fit”  within  the  American
mainstream.  Therefore,  provided  that  this  mobilization  does  not  only  constitute  a
temporary backlash against the influence of religious groups in American politics, but
manages to become established in the long run, it could also have a decisive influence on
how  most  Americans  view  atheism.  Along  with  the  rise  of  the  “unaffiliated”,  this
movement could progressively contribute to transform the dominant popular images of
unbelief  as  a necessarily “Un-American” and dangerous “stigma”,  which would make
religion slowly appear as a less indispensable warranty of individual morality and civic
solidarity in the United States, and thus as a more “open” boundary. 
33 An important sign of a possible “softening” of the “moral frontier” of religion in 21st
century America actually came on January 20th 2009, when Barack Obama declared in his
inaugural speech “We know that our patchwork heritage is a strength, not a weakness.
We are a nation of Christians and Muslims, Jews and Hindus - and non-believers”. This
widely  commented  mention  of  “non-believers”,  which  could  seem  anecdotic  to  any
foreign  observer,  was  a  meaningful  gesture  from  the  new  president  and  marked  a
noticeable evolution in the place commonly afforded to unbelievers in the discourse of
American  political  leaders.  Historically  forgotten  or  stigmatized  as  antagonistic  to
American  values,  they  suddenly  became  recognized  members  of  American  society,
besides other traditional religious groups - Christians, Jews, Muslims, etc. Obama’s phrase
was not only an unprecedented official acknowledgment that atheists actually do exist in
the United States, but also, and most importantly, that they are an integral part of the
fabric of this society – of “our patchwork heritage”. One reader of the New York Times
and  self-avowed  atheist  even  thanked  Obama  for  at  last  “recognizing  that  we  are
Americans, too,”89 while the director of NYC Atheists affirmed: “that one word legitimized
us! It said we belong”.90 The figure of the atheist, who had populated the nightmares of
numerous  generations  of  Americans  since  the  first  colonies,  and who could  only  be
considered as an “other”, became officially a mainstream American citizen by Obama’s
speech. Criticized by Christian conservatives as an attempt to “redefine the distinctively
Christian  American  culture”,  considered  by  other  commentators  as  the  “most
revolutionary  phrase  of  the  inaugural  speech,”91 Obama’s  reference  to  non-believers
clearly signaled their  first  symbolic inclusion within the boundaries of  the American
“circle  of  the  We”.And  one  can  hypothesize  that,  as  the  number  of  “unaffiliated”
Americans  continues  to  grow  in  the  coming  years,  and  will  thus  represent  a  more
significant percentage of the electorate, other politicians will follow Obama’s path and
strategically take into consideration non-believers or non-religious Americans. And as
they do so - and as non-believers gain more and more visibility in society – unbelief may
finally  start  to  slowly  appear  as  less  distant,  “repulsive”  and  “abnormal”,  perhaps
diminishing the historical threatening “otherness” of atheists in some Americans’ eyes.
Religion would thus also lose some of its importance as a “symbolic boundary” - some of
its relevance as a “moral status signal” and as an essential criterion for individual virtue,
citizenship and collective belonging in the United States. 
1.  
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IV Conclusion
34 The study of the status and perception of non-believers in the United States is eminently
telling  of  the  central  place  occupied  by  religion  in  Americans’  national  and  civic
imaginaries. Throughout American history, from the first colonies to the beginning of the
21st century, the figure of the atheist has crystallized Americans’ religious, social, political
and identity anxieties. Even as the acceptance of various other groups has increased, non-
believers have remained significantly disliked and stigmatized by a majority of Americans
until  today.  The  nature  of  the  prejudices  towards  them and the  vocabulary  used to
characterize their lack of belief in God -“deviance”, “immorality”, “danger” and “vice”-
stayed  remarkably  similar  over  the  centuries.  Demographically  insignificant,  atheists
have been for a long time a convenient “other” – if not the only one of course - against
which  Americans  could  heighten  and  reinforce  their  sense  of  belonging  and  their
collective  identity,  thus  revealing  the  central  role  played  by  religion  as  a  strong
“symbolic  code” and “moral  frontier” in American society.  Nevertheless,  the current
demographic and social trends concerning the place of “non-believers” in today’s United
States should still let wide open the reflection and the discussion on the future of religion
as a significant “symbolic boundary” in the United States. 
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RÉSUMÉS
Through the analysis  of  the status and perception of  atheists in  American history,  from the
colonial  times  to  the  beginning  of  the  21st century,  this  article  explores  the  importance  of
religion  in  the  structuring  of  Americans’  national  and  civic  imaginaries.  Starting  from  the
assumption that atheists have always tended to be a distrusted minority in the United States, this
essay seeks more precisely to explain how and why not to believe in God came to be regarded
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through  the  centuries  not  only  as  a  moral  and  social  deviance,  but  also  as  essentially  “un-
American” behavior. It further demonstrates that the historical “otherness” of the atheist tends
to indicate that religion has functioned as one of the “moral boundaries” of a certain American
“imagined community”, perceived as an essential warranty of both individual virtue and “good
citizenship” and as a basic attribute of the American “self”.
1.  I. Introduction
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